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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN, d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 890344-CA 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
and 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction: Appellant relies upon Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 and 
Rule 3 and 4A Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Respondents 
believe that Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(h) is applicable in 
this case also. 
Nature of Proceedings: Respondents take issue with the 
Appellant's Nature of Proceedings set forth in its brief and 
asserts that the Appellant-Plaintiff's case was an action 
founded on tortious interference with business interests, and 
bad faith dealings of the Respondents-Defendants with regard 
to the plaintiff. Appellant in its statement of the case now 
claims that this action is in the nature of a breach of 
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contract which contention was specifically rejected by the 
trial court as not pled and repeatedly objected to by the 
Respondents as being outside of the scope of the pleadings. 
This matter was tried on Appellant's complaint and 
the allegations and contentions contained therein before the 
Court sitting without a jury. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Respondents take the position that Appellant 
is bound by the issues it claims are the issues of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents disagree with Appellant's Statement of 
the Case and therefore set out their own statement. 
1. Plaintiff-appellant (Commerce herein) brought 
an action against the defendants-respondents (collectively 
Champs herein) asserting that Champs had not renewed a lease 
and had tortiously interfered with the business relations 
of Commerce; that the actions of Champs were in bad faith; 
and that Champs' actions served no legitimate business purpose. 
2. Champs had entered into a listing agreement with 
Commerce to find a lessee for a tract of property owned by 
Champs. The listing agreement expired by its own terms, but 
Commerce located a lessee who entered into a five year lease 
with an option to extend the lease for an additional five 
years if the tenant exercised its option by a date certain. 
The lessee did not exercise its option. The lease expired and 
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subsequently the lessee negotiated a new lease with Champs. 
Commerce brought this action against Champs claiming a 
commission and asserting bad faith and tortious interference 
with business interests. 
3. The action was tried to the Court, sitting without 
jury, upon the contentions of Commerce's complaint it not 
having moved to amend its pleadings and after it rested, Champs 
moved, under Rule 41(b), URCP, for a judgment of no cause of 
action, which was granted by the Court. 
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law were 
made and entered by the Court. Commerce moved to amend them 
but the motion was denied. Commerce timely appealed to 
the Supreme Court which referred this matter to the Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Commerce is a Utah corporation and a licensed 
real estate brokerage firm. (Finding of Fact No. 1, R-217, 
Answer, R-39, TR-43). 
(2) Champs are the general partners of Champ 
Associates, a Utah general partnership. (Findings of Fact No. 
2, R-217, TR-43). 
3. In 1981, Champs engaged Commerce to find a lessee 
for a tract of real property that Champs owned which was 
located in Salt Lake County (Findings of Fact No. 3, R-217, R 
-4, 29). Commerce eventually found a lessee, Dick Morrison 
Tire Company (Morrison herein) which entered into a five year 
lease on the property. (Finding of Fact No. 4, R-217). 
4* The Lease contained a provision that Morrison 
had an option to extend the lease for an additional five (5) 
year term, provided that Morrison exercised the option in 
writing on or before October 1, 1986. (Finding of Fact No. 5, 
R-217, 218, Lease, R-7, 14, 19, Answer, R-9). 
5. Champs paid Commerce the agreed upon commission 
for the five year lease which amounted to $17,820.00. (Finding 
of Fact No. 6, R-218, TR-44), and agreed to pay an additional 
commission if the lessee exercised the 5 year option to extend 
the original 5 year lease (Par 5, R-5). 
6. When the five year term was coming to a close, 
Wint Champ, one of the Champs, went the the owner of Morrison, 
Mr. Robert Morrison, in June of 1986, and asked him if he was 
going to exercise the option (TR-97, Deposition, Morrison, p. 
6, 7—admitted into evidence by stipulation, TR-26). Mr. 
Morrison stated that he was not sure if he was going to renew 
the lease. Mr. Morrison told the same thing to Mr. Lott, who 
was one of the principal officers of Commerce. (Deposition, 
Morrison, p. 7). 
7. prior to the October 1, 1986 dead-line for 
exercising the option Mr. Morrison testified that he was 
looking at other properties to lease and might move his 
business (Deposition, Morrison, p. 7, 9). 
8. Mr. Morrison testified that he did not exercise 
the option, and that he told Wint Champs and Lott that he was 
not going to exercise the option (Deposition, Morrison, pp. 7, 
-4-
1 1 ) . 
9. After the October 1, 1986 deadline Champs had 
their then legal counsel send a letter to Morrison advising it 
that the lease was terminated as of the end of the lease term 
due to the fact that the option had not been exercised 
(Finding (Finding of Fact No. 9, R-218, TR 20, 40). 
10. Thereafter, in November and December, 1986, 
Morrison negotiated with Champs for a new lease, (TR 74) and 
obtained the concessions that it wanted in the new lease 
(Deposition, Morrison, p. 15, 16). 
11. On January 6, 1987, after the termination of 
the old lease on December 31, 1986, (R-7) Morrison entered 
into a new Lease with Champs. (Finding of Fact No. 10, R-218, 
R-40). 
12. Commerce made demand upon Champs to pay a 
commission on the new lease, based upon the old commission 
agreement (Exhibit 4) which demand was rejected by Champs 
(TR-45) and Commerce commenced the instant suit. 
13. Commerce asserted that Champs had "tortiously 
interfered with the business interests of plaintiff" 
(complaint, par 9, R-03) and had "in bad faith" for "no 
business purpose other than to avoid" the payment of a 
commission to Commerce (Complaint, par 8, R-3) manipulated 
Champs tenant relationship with Morrison by sending the 
notice of cancellation (Complaint, par 6, R-3,TR-64). 
14. Morrison, however, testified that Champ 
urged him to renew the old lease (Deposition, Morrison, 
p. 14, TR-56) but Morrison was exercising his business 
judgment in not renewing it as he wanted a better deal. 
(Deposition, Morrision, pp. 14, 15). 
15. The Court affirmatively found that there 
was no evidence of bad faith on the part of Champs (Findings 
of Fact No. 12, R-219); that Champs had not caused Morrison 
not to exercise its option for the second five year term 
(Findings of Fact No. 11, R-218, 219); or any evidence 
that showed that Champs had no legitimate business purpose 
in refusing to extend the original lease (Findings of Fact 
No. 13, R-219); further, no evidence was introducted to show 
that Champs acted tortiously or interfered with the business 
interests of Commerce (Findings of Fact No. 14, R-219). 
16. Commerce introduced no instrument in 
writing that was a viable contract, still in force and 
effect, that provided for the award of attorney's 
fees (Findings of Fact No. 18, R-220). 
17. Commerce did not move to amend its pleadings 
at anytime before, during or after the trial to assert a claim 
under a contract theory or any other theory, other than that 
asserted in the complaint (Findings of Fact No. 15 and 16, 
R-219) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Commerce has failed to show any error on the part 
of the trial court or to cite where in the record 
the trial court erred. Commerce failed to 
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properly marshal the facts and reference the 
record thereto. 
2. Champs are entitled to sanctions, the award 
of attorney's fees and double costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
COMMERCE FAILED TO MAKE A CONCISE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN 
CONFORMITY WITH RULE 24, RULES 
OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Commerce in its brief has failed to set forth the 
facts that were proven with citations to the record as is 
mandated by Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
It is conceded that Commerce has set forth some 
facts and has given citations therefor, but not those found 
by the court amd entered as the Findings of Fact. Commerce has 
merely reasserted its theory upon which it tried the case and 
lost. 
Commerce studiously omitted from its recitation of 
the facts any reference to the Findings of Fact made by the 
trial court, or to one of the most important facts which is 
controlling over Commercefs theory, that is: The original 
lease had a mandatory option clause which had to be exercised 
if the lease was to be extended for an additional five years, 
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which option was not exercised by the lessee in spite of the 
urgings of Champs to the lessee to exercise the option. 
Commerce in its recitation of the facts has made 
reference to matters which were not received in evidence 
by the Court, such as answers to interrogatories and 
an affidavit of Commerce's attorney, which was not even 
tendered to the Court. (R-lll, 114). 
POINT TWO 
COMMERCE FAILED TO POINT OUT 
WHERE THE COURT ERRED IN RULING 
AS IT DID OR RULED CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE 
Commerce in its brief merely parrots what it espoused 
at the time of trial. 
Commerce claims that the first issue on appeal is 
that the trial court failed to apply Utah law with respect 
to a broker being entitled to a commission on a "lease 
renewal". 
It is respectfully submitted that Commerce must 
show that the lease was in fact renewed. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact held that 
the option to extend the lease was not exercised (R-218) 
and thus the old lease was not renewed. 
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral testamony or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987); Rule 
52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended effective 
January 1, 1987; See: "Standard of Review", set out in T. R. 
F.v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988). 
After Champs argued their Rule 41(b) URCP motion and 
after Commerce had responded thereto, the Court observed: 
" . . . but based upon the testimony that the 
Court has heard, it would appear that there was 
a new lease that was signed. The old lease was 
never extended. Notice time expired, and the 
evidence shows there was a new lease that was 
prepared. Although many of the provisions were 
the same, there were many provisions that had some 
differences in there. And based on the testimony 
there was serious negotiations in terms of 
renegotiation the new lease." (TR 114, 115) 
The Court went on and stated: 
"Because the evidence shows that there was 
a new lease, that there was no renewal, . . " 
They did not renew their lease and the new 
lease was entered into by the parties." (TR-115) 
Commerce in asserting its claimed issue, must show 
that there was a renewal of the lease. To do this, it must 
show that the Findings of the Court were in error. 
It has failed to do this. It is an appellant's 
burden to show that the evidence in the record does not 
substantiate the findings of the court. General Glass Corp v. 
Mast Construct Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Supreme Court in the case of Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985) stated: 
"To mount a successful attack on the 
trial court's findings of fact, an 
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appellant must marshal all the evidence 
in suport of the trial court's findings 
and then demonstrate that even viewing it 
in the light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. (citing authority) 
"Nowhere does he marshal the evidence 
supporting his version of the facts, 
much less the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. Under these 
circumstances, we decline to further 
consider Erickson's attack on the 
factual findings." 
To the same effect see: Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's 
Elec., 765 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1988). 
These cases are dispositive of the second issue 
raised by Commerce in its brief (p. 2 thereof), that the trial 
court erred in not construing the facts most favorable to 
Commerce. 
Commerce seems to fail to recognize that a full trial 
was conducted. Evidence was received. Testimony was heard. 
Commerce put on everything that it had but it failed to 
meet its burden of proving anything that would afford it any 
legal recourse against the Champs. In short it did not meet 
the burden of proof. Had this been a motion heard under Rule 
12 (b), URCP, then the weight would be with the opposing 
party, but here plaintiff tried its case and did not meet its 
burden of proof. As a matter of law it is not entitled to 
a preference on construing the facts most favorable to the 
plaintiff. 
Rule 41(b) URCP is very specific about the matter of 
a dismissal after the plaintiff has put on its evidence. 
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Justice Durham pointed out in Lemon v. Coates, 
735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987): 
"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 
is appropriately applied when the 
trial judge finds that the claimant 
has either failed to make out a prima 
facie case or when the trial judge is 
not persuaded by the evidence presented 
by the claimant". 
Commerce has not raised the propriety of the 
Court granting the Rule 41 (b) motion except to assert 
that the court did not apply law correctly. Commerce 
makes no reference to the record to establish the 
conditions upon which the law, if it is in fact the law, 
would be applied. It asserts that there was a lease 
renewal, but cites nothing from the record that shows 
that there was such a renewal. It asserts that Commerce 
procured a lessee, but makes no reference to the record to 
show that Commerce procured a lessee for the new lease, or 
that Champs accepted the lessee that Commerce procured for 
the new lease. 
The old lease expired by its terms and as pointed 
out in Cottonwood Mall Co., v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988) 
when a written lease terminates by its own terms at the 
expiration date and is not renewed by the parties, the courts 
cannot renew it for them. 
POINT THREE 
COMMERCE HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE 
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TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSTRUE 
THE FACTS MOST FAVORABLE TO 
COMMERCE IN GRANTING CHAMPS MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Commerce asserts that it is entitled to have 
the Court construe the facts in a light most favorable to 
it. It relies upon three Utah cases. However, these 
cases speak to who is to have the evidence weighted in their 
favor during the appellate process, not at the trial level. 
Commerce cites Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 
2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). Reliance upon this case is 
misplaced in that no Findings of Fact were made by the trial 
court in Davis, which is not the case now before the Court. 
Judge Uno made extensive Findings (R-216-220). 
Another case cited by Commerce was Lawrence v. 
Bamburger R. R, 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955). It is 
respectfully submitted that Commerce's reliance on this case 
is again misplaced in that this case when read in its 
entirety, is contrary to the contentions of Commerce. 
Justice Crockett in Lawrence v. Bamburger, pointed 
out that were the trial court made Findings of Fact, the 
appellate court had the duty to review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Findings of Fact made by the 
trial court, and that those Findings will not be disturbed 
unless the "appellant meets his burden of affirmatively 
showing error." Accord: Child v. Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351, 
400 P.2d 758 (1965); Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 
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17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); Petrie v. General 
Contracting Company, 17 Utah 2d 408, 413 P.2d 600 (1966); 
Great Salt Lake M & C Corp v. Arthur G. McKee & CO, 539 P. 
2d 371 (Utah 1975) . 
POINT FOUR 
COMMERCE WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES UNDER ANY THEORY 
Commerce raises as the third issue presented upon 
appeal, that of it being entitled to the award of 
attorney's fees. 
Before Commerce would have been entitled to any 
attorney's fees, it would have had to be the prevailing 
party. It was not. 
Before Commerce would have been entitled to 
any attorney's fees, it had to show that such entitlement 
was based upon a contract or upon a statute. B. R. Supply Co. 
v. J. M. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah, 1972); Turtle 
Management, Inc v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah, 
1982) . 
Commerce asserts that the written contract that 
entitled it to attorney's fees was the listing agreement 
(Exhibit 1). 
This document states on its face that it expired 
on March 31, 1981 (TR-24) and was only conditionally 
accepted by the Court as admitted evidence (TR-24), over 
the objection of Champs. 
The document having expired, there was no contract 
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or writing upon which attorney's fees could be awarded. 
Commerce did not put on any evidence as to 
attorney' fees, or the reasonableness or the value of the same 
during its presentation of its case, (TR-111, 114) nor did it 
make a formal motion to reopen. 
The amount of attorney's fees can only be 
proven by sworn testimony which is subject to cross 
examination. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT CANNOT CREATE A NEW 
CONTRACT FOR COMMERCE 
Commerce in its brief urges the Court to take the 
expired and cancelled listing agreement and intergrate its 
terms and conditions into the commission agreement that was 
executed by the parties and under which Champs paid Commerce 
the commission for the five year term of the lease. 
The listing agreement states on its face that it 
was to expire on the 31st of March, 1981 which was some months 
before Commerce found a lessee and the lessee, Dick Morrison 
Tire Company executed the lease. (Exhibit No. 1) 
Commerce cites no authority for this approach to 
contract law. The one case that it does cite Gregerson v. 
Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) stands for the proposition 
that several documents may be construed together to get around 
the statute of frauds bar in the sale of real property and the 
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granting of a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, 
neither being applicable in the instant case. 
POINT SIX 
COMMERCE INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE 
THAT ESTABLISHED THAT A TEN YEAR 
LEASE WAS ENTERED INTO 
Commerce predicates its entire factual scenerio upon 
the proposition that it procured a lessee who executed a ten 
year lease and thus the Champs owed the commission for the 
second five year term. 
This theory is flawed in that the lease agreement 
was for a five year term which expired on December 31, 1986. 
Not ten years, but five years. 
The lessee had the option to extend or renew 
the lease for an additioal five years, and had it done so, 
there is no dispute about Champs owing a commission for the 
renewed period. 
The Lease Agreement, paragraph 48, states: 
"The option to renew this lease shall 
be exercised by written notice delivered by 
the tenant to the landlord on or before 
October 1, 1986." 
The tenant did not exercise the option to renew. 
The "Commission Agreement", Exhibit "2", paragraph 
3, expressly states: 
"In the event the term of the Lease shall 
be extended pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 48 of the Lease, the commission 
payable . . . . " 
Paragraph 4 of the same instrument recites: 
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"Date of Payment 
Upon receipt of written notice 
of the exercise of the option 
to renew." 
No extension occured and no receipt of the 
required written notice was made. 
Clearly the written notice of exercising the 
option was a condition precedent to any agreement for the 
payment of any commission. 
In the early case of Associated Inv. Co. v Cayias, 
185 P. 778 (1920), the Utah court adopted the definition of 
a condition precedent as found in 6 Ruling Case Law § 290 
which is: 
"Condition precedent call for the performance 
of some act or the happening of some event 
after a contract is entered into and upon the 
performance or happening of which its 
obligations are made to depend." 
Commerce does not attack the findings of the Court 
which found that the option had not been exercised. (Findings 
of Fact, No. 8f R-218) or the Conclusions of Law, Nos. 1 and 
2, R-220). 
POINT SEVEN 
COMMERCE COULD NOT PREVAIL UNDER ANY 
THEORY OF LAW BASED UPON THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE 
Commerce based its complaint upon tortious 
interference with business opportunity and acts in bad faith 
which caused Morrison not to renew the old lease. (TR-18, 19). 
At no time did it seek to amend its pleadings, under Rule 15, 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other applicable Rule. 
Defendant, time and time again, objected to any contract 
theory being injected into the case. (TR 12-24, 25, 34, 35, 
49, 51, 54, 60, 63, 100, 107. The Court tried the matter on 
plaintiff's complaint. (TR-4; Conclusion of Law No. 3, R-
220) . 
The totality of plaintiff's appellate plea is to 
reassert what it argued below. It does not marshal the 
the evidence. It makes no reference to the facts of the 
entire record or those facts which were material to the 
Court's Findings of Fact. It does not assert that it proved 
any elements pled in its complaint which the trial court 
found had no merit. 
As pointed out in O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 
(Utah App. 1987): 
Defendant's claims on appeal simply 
controvert the findings of the Court. 
The Claims are not only without merit 
but also without basis in law or fact. 
Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of 
Rule 33(a) 
Bad faith need not be shown, Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 
395 (Utah App. 1987); O'Brien, supra., however, the appellant 
must show something other than that asserted below or some 
error of the lower court. 
Commerce is asserting that it is Utah law, even 
though the contract between the parties does not so state, 
that once a real estate broker locates a tenant, the landlord 
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is liable for a commission to the real estate broker, even 
though the legal relationship between the tenant and landlord 
ceases by the written terms of their agreement, if the tenant 
and landlord subsequently, without any collusion, fraud or 
wrongdoing between them, enter into a new arrangement. 
Commerce cites no authority for this theory of law. Two New 
York cases, are cited by Commerce, which on their facts, are 
not applicable to this case. Commerce put on no 
evidence whatsoever to show that there was collusion or some 
sort of arrangment between Champs and Morrison, nor did it 
plead such in its complaint. 
Commerce asserts: 
" . . the Champs should not be allowed 
to unilaterally manipulate the lease 
extension documents. . ." 
(Emphasis ours, Appellant's brief, p. 22. 
This is not a breach of contract claim as there must 
be two parties to an enforceable contract. Restatement of the 
Law, Contracts, 2nd § 9.; One cannot contract with himself. 
A conspiracy was not pled nor proved. Generally 
a civil conspiracy requires a combination of two or more 
persons who by some concerted action want to accomplish some 
criminal or unlawful purpose, or to injure another. 16 Am. 
Jur. 2d 267, Conspiracy, § 49. Nothing in the evidence 
shows that Champs and Morrison got together and entered into 
an arrangement whereby Morrison did not exercise its option. 
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No law has been cited by Commerce that makes it 
actionable to exercise one's legal rights. To the contrary, 
the law of Utah is clear that it is not a breach of contract 
to do an act which a person has a legal right to do. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962); 
Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
Commerce put on no proof to establish that 
the predominant or any purpose of Champ's act in sending the 
notice that the lease would terminate by reason of the 
failure of Morrision to exercise its option was to hurt 
or injure Commerce. Leigh Furniture and Carpet v. Isom, 
637 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) . 
Commerce could have inserted language into the 
commission agreement (exhibit 4) to protect its self 
if the Champs entered into an new lease with Morrison 
but it did not, and the Court should not insert that 
language into a contract for it. The Courts will not relieve 
a party of a bad bargain. Bray Lines Inc. v. Utah Carriers, 
Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 1987); Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
POINT EIGHT 
COMMERCE'S RELIANCE ON THE NEW YORK CASES 
CITED ARE MISPLACED 
Commerce cites New York case law for the 
proposition that Commerce was entitled to a commission. 
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A reading of these cases clearly and undeniably 
demonstates the meritless nature of this appeal and the 
reason why Champs are entitled to the award of attorney's 
fees and double costs. 
Commerce relies upon Mullen & Woods, Inc. v. 615 West 
57th Street, Inc., 146 Misc. 599, 262 N.Y.S. 467 (1933) at 
page 14 of its brief. This case states: 
"In the absence of special agreement, the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to 
commissions on subsequent extensions of 
which it was not the procuring cause." 
Emphasis ours. The Court then reversed the judgment in 
favor of the real estate broker and entered a judgment 
against it of no cause of action. 
Commerce asserts the holdings of Allwin Realty Co v. 
Barth, 146 N.Y.S. 960 (1914) at page 14 of its brief supports 
its position. This case is practically on all fours, 
factually, with the instant case. In that case there was a 
lease with an option to the lessee to extend, provided he did 
so, in writing, by a specified time. The lessee did not 
exercise the option and subsequently entered into a new lease 
with the defendant, landlord. Plaintiff, the broker, sued 
and the New York Court reversed a judgment in his favor. The 
third head-note of the reported case, succintly capsulates 
the case and states: 
"Even if that contract was enforceable, the 
broker was not entitled to any commission, 
where tenant failed to exercise its option at 
the time specified, but did take a new lease 
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with different provisions after considerable 
negotiations with the principal." 
The appellate Court observed: 
"The tenant, however, refused to exercise 
the option, and the right to an extended 
term of the lease expired and was at an 
end. The parties were then at liberty 
to make a new lease or to make whatever 
disposition of the property their interests 
required." (p. 963) 
The Court then reversed the judgment that the lower court 
had awarded the broker. 
The third case cited by Commerce, Rosenfeld Realty 
Company v. Cadence Industries Corporation, 75 Misc.2d 634, 
348 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1973) is, on its facts is entirely 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Rosenfeld, the 
Court pointed out that the landlord had deliberately, 
intentionally and willfully terminated the sub-lease which 
was the basis for the payment of the commission (p. 527 of 
N.Y.S. citation). 
New York adopts the same rationale as other states 
that a commission is payable only if it was procured through 
the services of the Broker. Bass Inv. Co. V. Banner Realty, 
Inc., 428 P.2d 142 (Ariz. App. 1967) vacated on other grounds 
436 P.2d 894; Hiniger v. Jody, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 
(1965); Record Realty, Inc., v. Hull, 15 Wash App. 826, 
552 P.2d 191 (1976) . 
Utah, by strong dicta in Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah 
16, 257 P.2d 944 (1953), follows the other states in holding 
that a commission claimed by a broker is for service 
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rendered. It rejected the plea of a broker who claimed that 
it was entitled to a commission where property was sold to 
someone it had casually mentioned to as being available, 
sometime after the listing agreement ran out. 
Commerce asserts that the lease between the Champs 
and Morrison was renewed, a fact that was expressly rejected 
by the trial court. Commerce cites nothing in the record 
that refutes this finding. 
Its reliance on case law dealing with actions 
predicated upon a renewal of an existing lease is misplaced 
and serves no valid purpose in this appeal. 
Commerce seems to be injecting, for the first time 
on appeal, the claim that there was a confidential or 
fiduciary duty between Champs on the one hand and Commerce 
on the other, and to this end cites Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 
16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953). A reading of this case discloses 
that, factually, it is completely remote from the instant 
case, but to the contrary, it asserts what has to be shown 
to establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship between 
persons. The case deals with the imposition of a constructive 
trust upon a piece of property which had been purchased, with 
a boy's money, by a relative. 
Commerce did not plead a confidential relationship 
between Champs and Commerce, or that there was a fiduciary 
duty arising between Champs and Commerce. It need no citation 
of law to assert that matters will not be entertained on 
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appeal that were not raised below. In any event there is, by 
law, no fiduciary duty running from a principal to a broker. 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc. Supra. 
Commerce asserts at page 20 of its brief that it 
would not have expended efforts in subleasing part of the 
property had it known that it would not have been paid a 
commission. No reference is given to the record to 
establish this assertion, again, first raised on appeal. 
But, to the contrary, Commerce was paid a commission 
for arranging the sublease to the post office (TR-28). 
POINT NINE 
CHAMPS ARE ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS 
AND THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
THIS APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Champs request the Appellate Court, pursuant to 
Rule 33 (a), Rules of the Court of Appeals, to award double 
costs and attorney's fees, in this matter. 
It is obvious, from the issues raised, the references 
to the record, or lack of the same, the law claimed to have 
been erroneously applied, that the appeal of Commerce is 
frivolous and for delay in the finalizing this matter. 
There is no legal or factual basis for this appeal. 
It is a continuation of the assertion of theories not plead, 
proven or founded upon any law recognized in Utah or 
elsewhere. 
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As pointed out in Porco v. Porco/ 752 P.2d 365 (Utah 
App. 1988) sanctions will be applied where an appeal is 
obviously without any merit and has been taken with little or 
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Commerce's, appeal should be 
summarily rejected, the trial court's decision affirmed 
and this matter remanded to the trial court for determination 
of Respondent, Champs', attorney fees and the award for double 
costs. 
Dated this 18th day of August, 1989. 
IRENE WARR 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Suite 280, 311 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ORIGINAL SIGNED FOR COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A*? ^ k 
This is to certify that on the ft* day of August, 
1989, the undersigned caused the required number of 
Respondents' Brief to be served upon the Appellant by 
hand delivery to: 
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utp*rB>lll 
LS 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C 8802446 
) Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, sitting without a 
jury, on the 17th day of February, 1989, the plaintiff 
appearing through one of its corporate employees and being 
represented by its attorney, Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.., and the 
defendants appearing by and through one of its general 
partners, F. W. (Winton) Champ, and being represented by their 
attorneys, Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq., and Irene Warr, Esq., 
and the Court having taken testimony and received evidence and 
the plaintiff having rested its case and the defendants having 
made a motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to prove 
a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the 
record and evidence adduced by it, and the parties having 
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submitted written memoranda to the Court,and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, now makes its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is a corporation duly licnesed 
by the State of Utah to act as a real estate broker and sales-
man. 
2. The Defendant, Champ Associates, is a general 
partnership, doing business in the State of Utah and that the 
individual named defendants are its general partners. 
3. The defendant, Champ Associates, ownes certain 
real property in Salt Lake County and in 1981 it desired to 
lease said property and retained the services of the plaintiff 
to find a lessee for said property. The defendant and 
plaintiff entered into a written contract which provided for 
certain commissions to be paid plaintiff in the event that it 
procured a lessee for the defendant. 
4. A lessee was located by the plaintiff and a five 
year lease was entered into by the defendant and Dick 
Morrison Tire Co., Inc., which lease was to run to December 31, 
1986. 
5. The lease agreement and a subsequent 
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, Champ 
Associates, provided that the lessee was given an option to 
extend the lease with the defendant for an additional five year 
term, but to do so the lessee had to exercise this option by a 
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written notice which had to be given before October 1, 1986• 
6. If the option was exercised by the Lessee 
before October 1, 1986, the defendant, Champ Associates, agreed 
to pay plaintiff an additional real estate commission of 
$17,820.00 under the terms and manner as specified in the 
Commission Agreement dated August 6, 1981 (Exhibit No. 4). 
7. Prior to October 1, 1986, the lessee through its 
principal officer, Robert Morrison, decided not to exercise 
the option to extend the lease for an additional five year 
term. He was looking at other properties,and also wanted to be 
able to extract concessions from the defendant in a new lease. 
8. Lessee, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc., did not 
exercise its option to extend the existing lease with the 
defendant. 
9. Defendant, Champ Associastes, caused its attorney 
to send a notice on October 31, 1986 to the lessee, Dick 
Morrison Tire Co., Inc., advising it that its rights to extend 
the lease under the option contained therein, had expired by 
reason of its failure to give written notice of the exercising 
of said option by October 1, 1986. 
10. That thereafter the defendant and Robert 
Morrision entered into negotiations for a new lease of the 
same property, which culimated in the defendant and Dick 
Morrision Tire Co., executing a new five year lease on January 
6, 1987. 
11. Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony 
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that the defendant or any of its general partners or anyone 
else caused Dick Morrison Tire Co., Inc., not to exercise its 
option to extend the original lease for the additional five 
year term. 
12. Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony 
that the defendants acted in bad faith in sending the notice of 
October 31, 1986 advising the lessee, Dick Morrison Tire Co., 
Inc., that its option had exprired; further there was no 
evidence or testimony showing any bad faith on the part of 
the defendants with respect the entire transaction between 
the defendants, the lessee, or the plaintiff. 
13. Plaintiff introducted no evidence or testimony 
evidencing that the defendants had no legitimate business 
purpose in refusing to extend the original lease or of 
entering into negotiations with Dick Morrison Tire Co., Inc., 
for a new lease of the property, or of entering into a new 
lease of the property on January 6, 1987. 
14. Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony 
evidencing that the defendants acted tortiously or interferred 
with the business interests of plaintiff by actions which were 
contrary to law. 
15. Plaintiff did not move the Court to allow it 
to amend its pleadings either before, during or after trial. 
16. Defendants during the course of the entire trial 
timely objected to any attempts of the plaintiff to go beyond 
the scope of its pleadings. 
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17. Plaintiff put on no sworn testimony with respect 
to attorney's fees, but relied upon an affidavit of its 
attorney filed by him in conjunction with a previous motion. 
18. The Commission Agreement (Exhibit 4) makes no 
reference to attorney's fees. 
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT the Court 
now makes its CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Even if this matter had been plead as an action 
founded upon a contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendants, the original Sales Agency Agreement was merged as a 
matter of law into the Commission Agreement of August 6, 1981. 
As a condition precedent to any commission for the extension of 
the existing lease being due and payable to the plaintiff by 
the defendant, the lessee had to timely give written notice of 
its intention to extend the existing lease for an additional 
five year term. 
2. Lessee failed to give notice, either written or 
oral, of its intention to extend the the existing lease. As a 
matter of law the condition precedent was not fufilled, and 
the plaintiff failed in its burden of proof of establishing a 
cause of action, founded upon contract. 
3. Plaintiff as a matter of law is bound by its 
pleadings, and as no motion was made to amend those pleadings, 
and as the issues of contract were timely objected to by the 
defendant throughout the entire trial of this matter, the 
~
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Court concludes that even if the plaintiff had moved to amend 
its pleadings to conform to the evidence, the Court would be 
within its discretion to deny such a motion. 
4. Plaintiff as a matter of law did not sustain its 
burden of showing that the defendants acted in bad faith in 
this matter, or that they did not have a legitimate business 
purpose in not extending the existing lease after the time 
had run for exercising the option to extend the lease for an 
additional five year term, or that the defendants acted 
tortiously or interferred with the business interests of the 
plaintiff by conduct that was contrary to the laws of Utah. 
5. The Court concludes that the plaintiff failed to 
prove a claim upon which relief could be granted and that, 
therefore, defendants1 motion was well taken and should be 
granted. 
Let Judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this/£_Lday of *Cbi«ua'ry, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
y£^*~* 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the/D th day of February, 
1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served upon the plaintiff 
by depositing a copy of the same into the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed to: 
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
These Findings and Conclusions are forwarded to the 
above party pursuant to Rule 4.504, Rules of Judicial 
Administration and any objection as to said Findings and 
Conclusions should be made within five (5) days of date of 
service. 
j*. ^ /^ > *» r% f\ 
RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under ap-
propriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and other authori-
ties cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this court and describ-
ing the nature of the proceedings below. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative, set out verbatim with the 
appropriate citation. If a pertinent part of a quotation is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in Paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, amd its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Para-
graph (3)). 
(8) A summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with' respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on. 
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RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court determines that 
a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including rea-
sonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may 
impose appropriate sanctions against any counsel who inadequately repre-
sents a client on appeal. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 52 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
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